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EXTENDING THE NORMATIVITY OF THE 
EXTENDED FAMILY:  REFLECTIONS ON 
MOORE V. CITY OF EAST CLEVELAND 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig* 
INTRODUCTION 
For decades, legal scholars have praised1 Justice William Brennan’s 
concurring opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.2  Scholars have 
applauded Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion for its acknowledgment of 
the many family forms existing in society and its recognition of the ways in 
which African American and immigrant family patterns have historically 
differed from the nuclear family pattern that is so commonly found in white 
suburban households.3 
In many ways, such widespread admiration of Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence is merited.  Unlike Justice Lewis Powell’s plurality decision, 
which does not mention race at all, Justice Brennan’s concurrence, joined 
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Fordham Law Review for their feedback on this project.  Finally, I give special thanks to my 
husband Jacob Willig-Onwuachi and our three children, Elijah, Bethany, and Solomon, for 
their constant love and support. 
 
 1. See, e.g., Robin Morris Collin & Robert William Collin, Are the Poor Entitled to 
Privacy?, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 181, 213–14 (1991) (using Justice Brennan’s analysis 
about African American families to show how zoning laws can become a powerful tool that 
“exclude[s] poor families based not only on physical attributes of land use but also on more 
nebulous attributes of the character of the community”). 
 2. 431 U.S. 494 (1977); id. at 506–13 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 3. See Enid Trucios-Haynes, “Family Values” 1990’s Style:  U.S. Immigration Reform 
Proposals and the Abandonment of the Family, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 241, 245–46 (1998) 
(relating Justice Brennan’s comments about the prevalence of extended families among 
African Americans and his critiques about the disparate effects of East Cleveland’s 
ordinance on African American families to constructions of families in the immigration 
context); see also Angela Mae Kupenda, Two Parents Are Better Than None:  Whether Two 
Single, African American Adults—Who Are Not in a Traditional Marriage or a Romantic or 
Sexual Relationship with Each Other—Should Be Allowed to Jointly Adopt and Co-Parent 
African American Children, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 703, 707–10 (1996) (praising and 
using Justice Brennan’s analysis to argue for single-parent adoptions by African Americans). 
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by Justice Thurgood Marshall, rejects this approach of colorblindness.4  
Instead, the concurrence attempts to engage the many ways in which legal 
and social constructions of family have been shaped by factors like race, 
immigrant status, and socioeconomic class, as well as the means by which 
purportedly neutral laws can have a negative, disparate effect on historically 
marginalized groups such as African Americans.5 
While Justice Brennan rejected the plurality’s colorblind approach, he 
unintentionally fortified the hierarchy of family structures in society by 
reinforcing an understanding of a common family form among African 
Americans—the extended family—as deviant.  This Article briefly 
examines and analyzes Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Moore as a 
means of exposing how deeply embedded the notion of African American 
familial deviance is in our society.  Specifically, this Article argues that the 
assumption of African American deviance in families is so strong that even 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s two most progressive justices at that time—
Justices Brennan and Marshall—failed to acknowledge and appreciate the 
inherent strengths of extended family forms when presented with an 
opportunity to do so.6  Indeed, rather than explaining why extended family 
forms are a model toward which all families can aspire, Justices Brennan 
and Marshall instead reduced extended families to an option that should be 
utilized only “in times of hardship” and “under the goad of brutal economic 
necessity.”7  Additionally, Justices Brennan and Marshall failed to advance 
judicial understandings about the complexities of racism when they chose 
not to explore and analyze the intraracial dynamics involved in East 
Cleveland’s regulation of families.  Such an exploration would have added 
a vital layer of understanding about the operation and practice of racism in 
contemporary society by exposing how internalized racism creates 
incentives for more-privileged African Americans to discriminate against 
less-privileged African Americans, precisely because more-privileged 
African Americans wish to distance themselves from negative stereotypes 
and perceptions that are associated with being black. 
Part I of this Article briefly recounts the plurality decision in Moore 
before analyzing Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion and detailing how 
the concurrence affirms, rather than deconstructs, the notion of African 
American deviance in families.  Next, Part II specifies the ways in which 
Justice Brennan could have truly uplifted African American families and 
other families of color by identifying and explicating the strengths of 
extended or multigenerational family forms among people of color and by 
showing how such family forms can be a model, or even the model (if one 
must be chosen), for all families.  Then, Part III concludes by enumerating 
 
 4. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 509–10 (Brennan, J., concurring). See generally Ian 
Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012) (offering a critique of 
colorblindness in legal doctrine). 
 5. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 509–10 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 6. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT:  KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, 
AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 47 (2d ed. 2000) (“In general, everything the imagined 
traditional family ideal is thought to be, African-American families are not.”). 
 7. Moore, 431 U.S. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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how Justice Brennan missed a key opportunity to explore and expose the 
intricacies and complications of both race and racial discrimination when he 
chose not to address the intraracial dynamics involved in the case.  After all, 
the City of East Cleveland that targeted and prosecuted Inez Moore, the 
African American plaintiff in the case, was a majority-African-American 
city with an African American City Manager and African American City 
Commission.8  Such an exploration of the case’s intraracial undercurrents 
not only could have disrupted societal understandings of the nuclear family 
as the normative ideal but also would have laid bare the pressures that 
African Americans have faced, both in history and at that time, to conform 
to the nuclear family structure.  Further, it would have revealed the 
internalization of myths about African American familial deviance by the 
black middle class in East Cleveland and would have shown the damaging 
consequences of such pressures and internalization. 
I.  REDRAWING THE BOUNDARIES OF FAMILY:  
THE DECISIONS IN MOORE V. CITY OF EAST CLEVELAND 
In Moore, the Supreme Court issued an important plurality decision in 
support of the principle of family autonomy when it held that an East 
Cleveland housing ordinance, which limited occupancy of a dwelling unit 
to members of one single family, violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.9  The plaintiff in the case was Mrs. Inez Moore, an 
African American grandmother who was living together with her son, Dale 
Moore Sr.; Dale’s son and her grandson, Dale Moore Jr.; and another 
grandson, John Moore Jr., whose mother, the daughter of Inez Moore, had 
passed away when John Jr. was a baby.10 
In early 1973, the City of East Cleveland sent Inez Moore a notice 
informing her that her grandson John Jr. was an illegal occupant of her 
home according to section 1351.02 of the municipality’s Housing Code and 
ordering her to comply with the section by permanently removing John Jr. 
from her home.11  Because Inez Moore refused to remove her grandson 
John Jr.—a child who had already experienced significant loss with the 
death of his mother—from the safety of her home, the City filed criminal 
charges against her and prosecuted the case.12  Inez Moore moved to 
dismiss the charge on the ground that section 1351.02 was 
unconstitutional.13  However, she lost her motion and was criminally 
convicted, sentenced to five days’ imprisonment and forced to pay a $25 
fine.14 
 
 8. See id. at 537 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 9. See id. at 496 (plurality opinion). 
 10. See id. at 496–97. 
 11. See id. at 497. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. 
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After Inez Moore had exhausted all appeals, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.15  Analyzing Moore’s due process claim, the Court 
acknowledged that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choice 
in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,”16 and it asserted that 
there is a “private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”17  
Noting that the “family is not beyond regulation,” the Court closely 
examined the applicable East Cleveland housing ordinance to determine 
whether its “intru[sion] on choices concerning family living arrangements” 
was required to serve the city’s stated motivations behind the statute:  
“preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and 
avoiding an undue financial burden on East Cleveland’s school system.”18  
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the invasive nature of the statute was 
not narrowly tailored to serve the purposes identified by the state, as the 
statute’s impact was both underinclusive and overinclusive.19  The Court 
explicated: 
[T]he ordinance permits any family consisting only of husband, wife, and 
unmarried children to live together, even if the family contains a half 
dozen licensed drivers, each with his or her own car.  At the same time it 
forbids an adult brother and sister to share a household, even if both 
faithfully use public transportation.  The ordinance would permit a 
grandmother to live with a single dependent son and children, even if his 
school-age children number a dozen, yet it forces Mrs. Moore to find 
another dwelling for her grandson John, simply because of the presence of 
his uncle and cousin in the same household.  We need not labor the 
point.20 
In so doing, the Court made a point of distinguishing Moore from Village of 
Belle Terre v. Boraas,21 where the Court held that the township had not 
violated the due process rights of the plaintiffs, a group of unrelated college 
students who lived together in one dwelling, by having and enforcing a 
statute that prevented groups of more than two unrelated individuals from 
occupying one-family units.22  Belle Terre, the Court asserted, did not 
control the decision in Moore because the “ordinance there affected only 
unrelated individuals” and “expressly allowed all who were related by 
‘blood, adoption, or marriage’ to live together.”23  By contrast, the East 
Cleveland ordinance was “slicing deeply into the family itself,” so deeply in 
 
 15. See id. at 498. 
 16. Id. at 499 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 
(1979)). 
 17. Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). 
 18. Id. at 499–500. 
 19. See id. 
 20. Id. at 500. 
 21. 416 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 22. See id. at 6–9 (upholding an ordinance imposing limits on the types of groups that 
could occupy a single dwelling unit). 
 23. Moore, 431 U.S. at 498. 
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fact that it made it “a crime [for] a grandmother[] . . . to live with her 
grandson in circumstances like those presented here.”24 
The Court went on to explain its rejection of the city’s contention that 
“any constitutional right to live together as a family extends only to the 
nuclear family.”25  Specifically, the Court asserted that despite the “risks 
[involved] when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain 
substantive liberties without the guidance of . . . the Bill of Rights,” history 
made it clear that protection was required in this instance, for there was a 
rich tradition “of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing 
a household along with parents and children” in the United States.26  
Ultimately, the Court, while citing to Pierce v. Society of Sisters,27 declared 
that neither East Cleveland nor any other municipality could force “all to 
live in certain narrowly defined family patterns,” particularly because many 
close relatives “come together for mutual sustenance” in “times of 
adversity.”28 
Two of the Justices in the plurality, Justices William Brennan and John 
Paul Stevens, each authored concurring opinions.  Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence became the subject of longstanding praise in legal academia 
because it acknowledged how notions of family can be raced and classed.29  
In that opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall, 
criticized East Cleveland for adopting a statute that identified the nuclear 
family, “the pattern [of family] so often found in much of white suburbia,” 
as the primary, if not the only, family form that should be promoted within 
its boundaries.30  Without mentioning that Inez Moore, her son, and her 
grandsons are African American, Justice Brennan detailed how East 
Cleveland’s housing ordinance was likely to have a disproportionate impact 
on African American families because extended and nonnuclear families 
are more common among African American citizens than white citizens.31  
In so doing, Justice Brennan offered comparative statistics on white and 
black families, noting that “13% of black families compared with 3% of 
white families include[d] relatives under 18 years old, in addition to the 
couple’s own children” and that “48% of . . . black households” that are 
headed by “an elderly woman,” as compared to only “10% of counterpart 
white households, include related minor children not offspring of the head 
 
 24. Id. at 498–99. 
 25. Id. at 500. 
 26. Id. at 502–04 (noting that “the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family 
precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition” and that history counseled against “cutting off any protection of family rights at 
the . . . arbitrary boundary . . . of the nuclear family”). 
 27. 268 U.S. 510 (1925); id. at 534–35 (holding state compulsory education law 
requiring students to attend solely public schools “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of 
parents . . . to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”). 
 28. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505–06. 
 29. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 30. Moore, 431 U.S. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 31. See id. at 508–09. 
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of household.”32  More so, Justice Brennan argued, the ordinance was 
troubling because it intensified the economic burdens of families who were 
struggling financially and working hard to survive “under the goad of brutal 
economic necessity.”33  These nonnuclear families, Justice Brennan 
proclaimed, were regularly formed as “a means of survival[] for large 
numbers of the poor and deprived minorities of our society,” as 
demonstrated by the family forms utilized by the “successive waves of 
[white] immigrants who populated our cities” and had “been victims of 
economic and other disadvantages that would [have] worsen[ed]” had they 
been “compelled to abandon extended, for nuclear, living patterns.”34 
Despite his recognition of the manner in which families can be and are 
raced and classed, Justice Brennan indicated that he did not believe the East 
Cleveland ordinance was racially motivated.35  Indeed, he proclaimed that 
“[t]he record of this case would not support that implication” (though he 
provided no explanation for this conclusion).36  Still, Justice Brennan noted 
that he was concerned about disparate effects because, “in prohibiting [the 
nonnuclear, extended] pattern of family living as a means of achieving its 
objectives, appellee city ha[d] chosen a device that deeply intrude[d] into 
family associational rights that historically have been central, and today 
remain central, to a large proportion of our population.”37 
Only in Justice Potter Stewart’s dissent did it become clear why Justice 
Brennan was reluctant to believe that East Cleveland’s enforcement was 
motivated by a racially discriminatory intent.  In that dissent, Justice 
Stewart revealed how a number of the decision makers in East Cleveland 
shared the racial background of Inez Moore, writing: 
I fail to understand why it follows that the residents of East Cleveland are 
constitutionally prevented from following what Mr. Justice Brennan calls 
the “pattern” of “white suburbia,” even though that choice may reflect 
“cultural myopia.”  In point of fact, East Cleveland is a predominantly 
Negro community, with a Negro City Manager and City Commission.38 
In essence, Justice Stewart’s concurrence exposed both his and Justice 
Brennan’s mistaken assumption that somehow African Americans were 
incapable of discriminating against other African Americans—here, that 
 
 32. Id. at 509–10; see also Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn’t 
Know Best:  Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 865, 901–10 (2003) (detailing how the prevalence of multigenerational families among 
African Americans and Latinos is not simply due to economic concerns but also cultural 
values and norms about closeness to family).  Additionally, in her book Failure to Flourish:  
How Law Undermines Family Relationships, Clare Huntington highlights how “[m]ore than 
51 million families now live in multigenerational homes.” CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO 
FLOURISH:  HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 99 (2014). 
 33. Moore, 431 U.S. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 34. Id. at 508–09. 
 35. See id. at 510. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 537 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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Inez Moore could not be the victim of racial discrimination, because the 
alleged perpetrators were African American. 
II.  REIFYING OR CHALLENGING 
THE NOTION OF THE NUCLEAR FAMILY 
AS THE NORMATIVE IDEAL? 
To be sure, Justice Brennan should be commended for his willingness to 
recognize the role that race has played in constructing families as well as 
family law.  It is important to acknowledge, however, that even Justice 
Brennan’s attempt to champion African American families reified notions 
of black families as deviant.  Although Justice Brennan’s concurring 
opinion highlighted how facially neutral statutes like East Cleveland’s 
section 1351.02 could “intrude” on African American families in ways that 
are exclusionary39 and expressed the centrality of extended family units for 
African American families and white immigrant families in the past, it also 
reinforced the notion of the nuclear family as the ideal for American 
families, an ideal that should be pursued in all communities unless the 
families were facing challenging financial and social circumstances.40  As 
Justice Brennan explained, he saw the prevalence of “the ‘extended’ 
form . . . among black families” as a reflection of “the truism that black 
citizens, like generations of white immigrants before them, have been 
victims of economic and other disadvantages.”41  Indeed, it was not the way 
that the East Cleveland housing ordinance placed nuclear families at the 
center that Justice Brennan found troubling but rather the way that the 
ordinance “display[ed] a depressing insensitivity toward the economic and 
emotional needs of a very large part of society.”42  Similarly, when Justice 
Brennan spoke of the role that extended families had played “for successive 
waves of immigrants who populated our cities,” he did so in a way that 
implied that such immigrant families quickly and rightfully left behind 
those purported “nonideal” family forms once they had climbed out of their 
economically depressed situations.43 
Additionally, rather than detail the many strengths of extended or 
multigenerational family forms as a general matter or express how such 
family forms can be a strong model of the kind of support and love that all 
family members should provide for each other, Justice Brennan authored 
his concurrence with a presumption that families turned to the support that 
extended families can provide only “in times of hardship” and “under the 
goad of brutal economic necessity.”44  For economically struggling 
families, he wrote, “compelled pooling of scant resources require[d] 
compelled sharing of a household.”45 
 
 39. See id. at 510 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. at 509. 
 42. Id. at 507–08. 
 43. Id. at 508. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. (emphasis added). 
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That Justices Brennan and Marshall, two progressive jurists with strong 
records of upholding the rights of subordinated citizens, including African 
Americans, would presume the deviance of prevalent family forms in black 
communities is not surprising given the historical demonization of black 
families by politicians and policymakers, many of whom were also well 
intentioned.46  For example, in 1965, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a 
liberal politician, articulated a narrative about black female-headed 
households as the source of the destruction and dysfunction of African 
American families that plagued the black community in U.S. society.47  
Referring to black female-headed households as a “tangle of pathology,”48 
Senator Moynihan blamed black mothers—not past and present racism or 
other structural impediments that make it difficult to climb out of difficult 
circumstances—for problems with drug use, poverty, and educational 
disparities in the black community.49  He argued that the black family is 
“the principal source of most of the aberrant, inadequate, or antisocial 
behavior that [it] did not establish, but now serves to perpetuate.”50  Like 
Senator Moynihan and other critics, Justice Brennan simply failed to 
appreciate how extended families are great examples of the support 
obligations and commitments that family members can satisfy for each 
other. 
III.  EXPLORING AND EXPOSING THE COMPLEXITIES 
OF RACE AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
In addition to failing to underscore the inherent value of 
multigenerational families, both the majority and concurring Justices 
missed out on an important opportunity to flesh out the complexities of 
racial subordination when they failed to address the role that middle-class 
African Americans, who constituted the majority of residents in East 
Cleveland, played in reinforcing a racialized normative vision for families.  
Specifically, the Justices failed to acknowledge and explain how the actions 
of the black middle class in East Cleveland constituted a form of racism, 
not just classism, against poor and working-class African Americans.  Had 
 
 46. See, e.g., DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY:  
THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 29–46 (1965); Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads & Welfare 
Queens:  How Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 233 (2014). 
 47. MOYNIHAN, supra note 46, at 9–14; see also Ann Cammett, Welfare Queens Redux:  
Criminalizing Black Mothers in the Age of Neoliberalism, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 363, 
391 (2016) (indicating that Senator Moynihan’s “report immediately provided the lynchpin 
for successful efforts to defund the social safety net through welfare reform, and 
conservative theorists continue to use it in order to give voice to victim-blaming theories of 
poverty”); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring:  Welfare Reform’s Marriage 
Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1670 (2005) (“Senator 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s 1965 governmental report reinforced race-based stereotypes in its 
examination of the negative influence of illegitimacy and the lack of marriage on the black 
family.”). 
 48. MOYNIHAN, supra note 46, at 29. 
 49. See id. at 29–46. 
 50. Id. at 30; see also Alycee Lane, “Hang Them If They Have to Be Hung”:  Mitigation 
Discourse, Black Families, and Racial Stereotypes, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 171, 192 (2009). 
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the Justices explored such intraracial complexities in Moore, they not only 
could have revealed the pressures that African Americans have faced (both 
in history and at that time) to conform to the nuclear family structure but 
also could have revealed the internalization of myths about African 
American familial deviance by the black middle class in East Cleveland that 
has resulted in racial discrimination by African Americans against other 
African Americans. 
The first scholar to fully delve into the intraracial dynamics of the Moore 
case was Robert Burt, who defended the city of East Cleveland’s ordinance 
and criticized the majority and concurring opinions.51  As with Justice 
Brennan, Burt viewed the nuclear family model as the ideal model for 
which to strive.52  In Burt’s eyes, the real losers in Moore were black-
middle-class families in East Cleveland.53  Viewing East Cleveland’s black 
middle class as “socially and economically upwardly mobile” and seeing its 
housing ordinance in section 1352.02 as an understandable effort by the 
black middle class to distance itself from what he identified as “the ghetto 
life-style,” Burt argued that the decision in Moore made it such that “the 
nuclear families that had come together in East Cleveland could find 
nowhere to remain together as a self-consciously contained community.”54 
Burt, however, failed to understand that African Americans can also 
discriminate against other African Americans.  As numerous social 
psychologists have shown in their research, African Americans can be just 
as susceptible as other races to internalizing negative racial stereotypes 
about African Americans as a group, developing implicit as well as 
conscious biases against their own group and, more so, acting on those 
negative implicit perceptions.55  No work illustrates this phenomenon better 
than Professor Audrey McFarlane’s article “Operatively White?:  Exploring 
the Significance of Race and Class Through the Paradox of Black Middle-
Classness.”56  McFarlane, a land use and economic development scholar, 
has highlighted how the inclusion of middle-class blacks in middle-class 
neighborhoods (even as they are experiencing white flight like East 
Cleveland was) or gentrifying neighborhoods can obscure the racial nature 
of problems in transitioning locations.57  Specifically, McFarlane explains 
that “affluent Blacks sometimes demonstrate that they have similar 
incentives to Whites—to avoid, run away from, or oppose projects or 
 
 51. See Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 388–
91. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. at 390; see also Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal:  Romance, Community, and 
Tradition in William J. Brennan, Jr.’s Constitutional Thought, 77 VA. L. REV. 1261, 1323–
25 (1991). 
 55. See, e.g., Audrey G. McFarlane, Operatively White?:  Exploring the Significance of 
Race and Class Through the Paradox of Black Middle-Classness, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Fall 2009, 163; Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from 
a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 105 (2002). 
 56. See McFarlane, supra note 55. 
 57. See id. at 163–67. 
2664 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
endeavors that would benefit lower-income Blacks”58—in part because 
black middle-class neighborhoods are more likely to border poor 
neighborhoods than white middle-class neighborhoods and are often 
“communities with less retail, inferior services, [and] less commercial 
services.”59  Thus, McFarlane notes, “[T]he black middle class are not as 
successful at protecting their turf as [the] white middle class are.”60  In fact, 
my own work explicates the practice of “distancing,” in which the most 
racially palatable African Americans form their identities in ways that can 
purposefully distinguish them from those African Americans viewed as 
falling in line with negative racial stereotypes.61  Had Justice Brennan 
directly challenged Justice Stewart’s dissenting contention that racism 
could not be at play in Moore, because the majority of East Cleveland was 
black, he would have articulated an understanding of the practice of racism 
that could have helped guide the development of antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence in other areas of law such as employment and housing 
discrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Moore illustrates the power of 
negative stereotypes about and perceptions of black families.  In American 
society, the black family has long been demonized and painted as deviant 
and dysfunctional—as the very root of social problems and inequities in the 
black community.  In a world where champions for racial justice like 
Justices Brennan and Marshall are just as likely to operate under an 
assumption of black deviance as those who have pathologized black 
families, it is hard to imagine things changing at any point soon without 
greater emphasis on and greater understanding of black families and racism 
in all its complexities. 
 
 58. Id. at 165. 
 59. Id. at 187; Angela Onwuachi-Willig, For Whom Does the Bell Toll:  The Bell Tolls 
for Brown?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1526 (2005) (discussing how black middle-class 
neighborhoods are more vulnerable to “poverty, higher crime, failing schools, and fewer 
services than . . . white middle-class neighborhoods”); see also Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-
Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration:  A Post-Integrationist Vision for 
Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729, 755–70 (2001) (same). 
 60. McFarlane, supra note 55, at 187. 
 61. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895, 
1898, 1921–26 (2007). 
